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‘Our House Has Burnt’: 
Beyond the Dialectics of Place 
and Space
To talk about space is more than merely to describe it. Due consideration must 
be given to the phenomenology of perception which discloses the preconditions 
of seeing that regulate our conceptualizations of places: cultural modes of space 
formation and appreciation1 as well as various practices of visual or verbal repre­
sentation through which places make themselves available in social intercourse. 
The overall effect of our response to a given space lies in our shifting sense of 
its well-placedness (a space categorized in terms of specific objects and the spa­
tial niches in which these objects find their ideal localization, i.e. where they are 
‘well-placed’) or its dis-placedness, which speaks less of the aesthetic value of 
a given space and more of the way in which things ‘disturb’ one another in a specific 
realm, are not ‘localizable’ but themselves tend to designate their ‘own’ domains. 
As a result, the reality described as ‘ill-placed’ cannot be easily subsumed under 
the heading of one specific type of space (e.g., ‘home’, or ‘motherland’) but ge­
nerates a multiplicity of local, peripheral spaces operating in their own terms. This 
tension between things that are ‘well-placed’ (localizable) and ‘dis-placed’ (loca­
lizable but unorganizable, inasmuch as they resist strategies of homogenization) 
is already traceable, for example, in the traditional American controversy between 
the Romantic sense of at-homeness in nature and the expansionist aversion to wil­
derness. Roderick Nash’s claim that ‘Romanticism had cleared away enough of 
the old assumptions to permit a favourable attitude toward wilderness without 
entirely eliminating the instinctive fear and hostility a wilderness condition had 
produced’,2 can thus also be represented as a clash between the sense of ‘well 
placedness’ (eminent in the Romantic attitude to nature) and ‘dis-placedness’ which 
entailed in its programme a whole series of purgative and sanitary practices 
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through which a given territory was to assume aspects of ‘well-placedness’, i.e. 
space. If the wilderness was to remain a model of man’s operations in nature, then 
it would necessarily imply a radical limitation of man’s interventionism, which is 
aimed at imposing upon a given area (i.e. man’s system of preferences and which, 
through strategies of homogenization may transform a multiplicity of chaotic places 
into one cosmic (i.e. orderly and regulated) space.
As has been argued above, however, these two models never appear in their 
‘pure’ form but always simultaneously and unassumingly shape our response to 
spatiality, thus exerting a powerful influence upon the sense of one’s (individual 
and cultural) identity. As Mark Treharne claims in his essay on the topographical 
poetry of Philippe Jaccottet, another way of presenting this interplay is through 
the concepts of the ‘familiar’ and the ‘unfamiliar’. The former would stand for 
what we call ‘well placedness’, the latter for ‘dis-placedness’ of things and their 
spatial relations. At the junction between the two stands the ‘epiphany’, a moment 
when ‘the world is not at anchor’.’
Thus, to see a place, to live in it as its citizen (with all the political and social 
implications of the term) means to experience crises in its mode of familiarity. 
A way towards one’s authentic identity within a culture leads through this night 
of radically critical insight into a complex network of familiarization mechanisms. 
These crises (or epiphanies) rest on two disclosures: the first is contained in Jac- 
cottet’s phrase that the world in ‘not at anchor’; the other undermines the notion 
of the transparency of everyday places which, as a result, can become one homo­
geneous ‘space’. In the world of the ‘well-placed’, things are ‘at anchor’, i.e. they 
are stabilized (if not immobilized) by their essences (familiarity implies that we know 
what a given thing ‘is’) and their applicability (we know what the ‘use’ of a given 
object is) and thus they can be clearly mapped in two ways. Firstly, each thing has 
an identifiable location where it can best actualize its value and where a thing is 
defined as belonging to a particular sphere of the public everyday. Secondly, on 
a personal level, places function as memory locations, i.e. objects can be described 
and defined not only in terms of their everyday value (i.e. their common applica­
bility) but as memoiy units in which the public is linked with the private.
Such mapping is most typically applied to the realm of ‘home’ which, like 
a country mansion described by Adam Mickiewicz in the 1834 Polish national epic 
Pan Tadeusz, is constructed as a result of several procedures: a coherent synchro­
nizing of the natural, theological, and social; a clear ordering of social and do­
mestic roles leading to the allotment of specific, unquestionable spaces to each 
member of the community; a profound internalizing of such an ordering which func­
tions on the strength of revelation rather than consensus; the formation of ‘home’ 
as a replica and substitute of the state, leading, in effect, to the historization of 
the everyday in which the object frequently functions as a reminder and a secret 
codification of national history. In Pan Tadeusz the main protagonist returns home 
after many years of schooling in a distant city:
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Since he had seen the house long years had past, 
And now, his schooling over, he returned at last. 
The ancient walls he hastened to behold 
As tenderly as they were friends of old. 
The hangings and the furniture that day 
Were just as when a child he used to play
He saw the chiming clock in wooden case; 
With childish joy the young man pulled the string 
To hear Dabrowski’s old mazurka ring.4
‘Home’ is a territory where individual places coalesce into a harmonious whole, 
where the personal is likely never to remain on the level of the purely and ex­
clusively personal but is saturated with the communal and historical. In brief, 
‘home’ is where many ‘places’ become one ‘space’. The result of this process is 
a marked simplification of the public or social. If, as François Lyotard claims, this 
sphere appears always and inevitably at the ‘moment of the phrase” and is always 
complex, then a clear arrangement of all the participants in the scene of commu­
nication makes the social, if not less complex, then necessarily more transparent 
and subject to an easier mapping. In the world ‘at anchor’, as in the traditional 
community described by Mickiewicz, the individual has access to the public past 
through his/her immediate surroundings in which objects acquire the status of in­
dex-cards, or sources of power, which afford access to past events. Through the 
objects of everyday life, one is connected with the events of the past. In the text 
in question, written in 1834, during a period in which Poland had been absent as 
a political entity from the map of Europe for over a century, this aspect is par­
ticularly striking as it is only through the revelatory power of everyday objects as 
power points transmitting the energy of the past that an individual could retain his/ 
her national identity in the absence of any available political structure which he/ 
she could define as his/hers.
In the reality of ‘home’ there is no room for forgetfulness because even if one’s 
private memory weakens or is blurred, everyday objects ‘remember’ the past for 
us. At ‘home’ one is remembered by a larger power (the past). Home is part of 
a structure whose visible foundations are in the immediate surroundings but whose 
apex escapes human sight due to its temporal extension (past events which are no 
longer ‘present’, or may even be ‘banned’ from the now, nevertheless still reside 
or ‘haunt’ the everyday world by having been encoded in the objects at hand) and 
theological construction.
The latter is significant because the reality of the ‘well-placed’ is kept to­
gether partly by what we may refer to as a certain ‘gravitational pull’ due to which 
an object both attracts the human glance and, at the same time, refuses to be the 
sole addressee of this glance, sending it on to a larger power which acts as 
a guarantor of the whole system which allows for the transformation of places into 
one space. This guarantor has the status of a God and in this way we can assume 
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there can be no ‘home’ which would be ‘Godless’, which would not gravitate 
towards a center, a God; no ‘home’ which would not have its ‘theology of the eve­
ryday’ on the strength of which identity is established and perpetuated.
The everyday locates at its center the past in which the individual blends with 
the community thus establishing his/her presence. To put it more dramatically, it 
constitutes the now as a mourning for the past which is clearly outlined, mapped 
or encrypted in the present. In theological discourse, which, as has been sug­
gested, is inevitably coded in the ‘well-placed’ this reading of the enduring role 
of the past, which is only apparently neglected and forgotten, is significant because 
it evokes the scene of the crypt, the central and most powerful story of Christian­
ity: the pious gather round the encrypted body of Christ. The piety of home is 
constituted, constructed (the importance of this word will become immediately 
clear) by the power of the dead (the past) which generates hope for the future. In 
this system the now is a moment of mourning without despair, a scene of melan­
choly, a moment of death which displays the construction of reality in the figure 
of a dead body: ‘For wheresoever the carcase is there will the eagles be gathered 
together’ (Mt, 24, 28). The carcase is not only a dead body but also a construc­
tion, a skeleton of an architectural structure. Thus one could claim that the eve­
ryday of home, of the ‘well-placed’, is no less than a gathering of the pious round 
the dead body of the past buried in the objects at hand and which is revealed as 
the true construction of reality. The athandedness of the everyday, of the ‘well- 
placed’, is founded upon remembrance which facilitates the identity determination 
processes and upon the (hidden) presence of the center, a source of legitimization 
and ordering.
This brings us back to the question of perception mentioned at the begin­
ning of this essay. The ‘well-placed’ generates its power and its legitimization 
of individual and cultural identity strategies from the ultimate overcoming of 
the difference in the disclosure of the foundational One. As Emmanuel Levi­
nas puts it: ‘To see is to make use of separation ... as a form of the immediate, 
the non-mediated. In this sense also, to see is to have the experience of the 
continuous, and to celebrate the sun, that is to say, beyond the sun itself: the 
One’.6
The metamorphic, rather than transformative, model of the everyday, which we 
refer to as the world of the ‘dis-placed’ can also be presented, in contradistinction 
to the ‘well-placed’, as the OPAQUE structure which sees predominantly in ‘the 
swarming mass’. According to Michele de Certau, the story of masses ‘begins on 
the ground floor, with footsteps. They are myriad, but do not compose a series. 
They cannot be counted because each unit has a qualitative character: a style of 
tactile apprehension and kinaesthetic appropriation. Their swarming mass is an 
innumerable collection of singularities. Their intertwined paths give their shape 
to spaces. They weave places together ... They are not localized; it is rather that 
they spatialize’.7
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The ‘opaque’, equivocal, translational1’ character of everyday practices, which 
start developing in industrial and postindustrial Europe, seems to focus on two ele­
ments. Firstly, as Walter Benjamin has noted, it allows for a strange co-existence 
of the regulated and organized alongside the de-regulated and ‘un-organized’. The 
town results from a series of administrative, technological and sociological deci­
sions imposed by the whole apparatus of force, but, at the same time, the mul­
titude of inhabitants living in these regulated spaces exercise every day their right 
to ‘give shape to [their] spaces’. Secondly, the whole series of everyday life practices 
and constructions of spatiality (e.g. daily shopping routes, afternoon strolls, etc.), 
although occurring within the functionalist reality of planning and design, all of 
a sudden reveals traces of an ‘artistic’ activity.
Although the opacity of the ‘dis-placed’ does not result in the elimination of 
identity, it does render its character problematic. If Jaccottet is right in his claim 
that ‘self-absorption increases the opacity of life’,9 then the opacity in question 
in the modem and postmodern ‘dis-placed’ (the difference between the two being 
the nostalgic rejection of displacedness in the modern and its affirmative appre­
ciation by the postmodern) is generated by the self which ‘absorbs’ each particu­
lar situation and determines its identity strategies according to the demands of the 
local, temporary scene without permanent reference to an external, over-arching 
system of validation. Thus, while in the ‘well-placed’, we identify not only the self, 
but also its movement through a multiplicity of places and events on the strength 
of the strategies which turn places into one homogeneous space identifiable as 
‘home’ (in the ‘well-placed’ there is always a steady and reassuring line of rela­
tionship between personal self identity and the identity and nameability of the space 
it occupies), in the ‘dis-placed’ we may only use the term 'sous rature’. In the 
‘dis-placed’, the verb to ‘live’ (predicating all the actions undertaken at, and in 
the name of, ‘home’) finds its three supplements.
The first comes from the late Romantic period, the other two from much more 
recent discourse, but both emphasize the clement of estrangement, unfamiliarity, 
the opacity of man’s relationship to places which stubbornly slip away from the 
incursions of one homogeneous space, away from the continuous seeing which, 
according to Levinas, is the experience of ‘the One’. In the ‘dis-placed’, seeing 
is dis-continuous. The ‘well-placed’ believes in the measurable relationship be­
tween immeasurability (God, for instance) and the defined and determined (par­
ticular essents): this is the source of the transparency of its system. (See Carlyle’s 
famous dictum ‘Nature is a living garment of God’). The ‘dis-placed’ stems from 
the awareness of the fissure and incommensurability between the two. The maps 
of the ‘dis-placed’ are still maps, but they are carried out so as to compromise 
the very idea of the precision of map-making.
David Thoreau, in his essay on walking, describes man’s relationship with pla­
ces as that of ‘sauntering’. The dictionary meaning of the verb, given as ‘leisurely 
walking’ is, in Thoreau’s lesson, amplified by two etymological digressions.
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According to the first, the verb comes from La Sainte Terre which name was given 
in the Middle Ages by beggars as the answer to the inquisitive questioning of alms- 
givers who wanted to know the destination of their vagrant paths. The other harks 
back to an equally distorted French phrase sans terre, i.e. ‘without land, home, 
permanent dwelling’."1 To saunter therefore combines the sense of homelessness 
characteristic of the modern and postmodern identity with a decisive hint at the 
final destination (the Holy Land) which is embedded in the seemingly centerless 
and meandering lines of errancy. As Thoreau himself points out, the situation 
described refers to one who has no particular home ‘but [is] equally at home 
everywhere’. The question of both individual and cultural identifiability in this 
model of the ‘dis-placed’ is paradoxically based on turning the dis-placedness into 
well-placedness (one is homeless not because one does not have a home but because 
home is everywhere): by uncovering our dis-placedness we find our place which 
is never quite ‘proper’ in itself, but is authenticated by the ultimate goal embed­
ded in its structure. The source of the identity construction is then the awareness 
of displacedness which is controlled and countered by the security of the desti­
nation which (through the dictate upon our actions) stabilizes and, in part, soli­
difies our self. This marks an unexpected turn towards Thoreau’s contemporary, 
Hegel, who claimed that the identity of philosophy, the dignity of thought, stems 
from the ‘between, a narrow separation of a scission, from a cleavage, from a se­
paration, from a division into two’, and a similar turn towards sanctity, although 
this time it is not a sanctity of the land, but of the family. As Derrida notices, 
‘A fissure - which reaches its absolute in the absolute religion - spells the need 
for philosophy. Philosophy, like its proper object, stems from Christianity whose 
truth it is, from the Holy Family (la Sainte Familie) which it overcomes’.11
Annie Dillard’s version of Thoreau’s ‘sauntering’, interestingly, also builds upon 
an etymological excursion into the French language, emphasizing the mobility and 
uprootedness of man in relation to places (hence questioning the idea of‘home’ which 
is where we leave from in order to, eventually, come back) in the term ‘sojourning’. 
Referring to mangroves which, floating on oceans and rivers, ‘make their own soil 
from scratch’, Dillard identifies humanity as ‘sojourners’ aiming ‘nowhere’. This last 
word is of particular importance as it distinguishes Dillard’s ‘sojourning’ from 
Thoreau’s ‘sauntering’ with its inherent sense of destination. According to Dillard, 
‘The word “nowhere” is our cue: the consort of musicians strikes up, and we in the 
chorus stir and move and start twirling our hats. A mangrove island turns adrift to 
dance. It creates its own soil as it goes over the salt sea at random...’12
Finally, Deleuze and Guattari who, like de Certeau, speak of ‘swarms’ focus 
on the concept of the ‘nomad’ whose ‘self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming 
between two multiplicities’. Like Kleist, Lenz and Büchner, the nomad has 
a different mode of travelling which is definable only ‘as coming and going rather 
than starting and finishing’, a situation in which even ‘the proper name is the 
instantaneous apprehension of a multiplicity’.13
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‘Sauntering’, ‘sojourning’, and ‘deterritorialized nomadism’ replace ‘dwelling’ 
as well as ‘home’ and also establish other identity procedures. The implication of 
discontinuity is obvious: a linear system of the ‘well-placed’ (which, as we have 
seen, entailed memory as the central part of the present) is replaced by the punc­
tual antimemory of the ‘dis-placed’ where each ‘now’ forms, as it were, a separate 
block between which no straight line of mere recollection is possible.
End-note: ‘Our house has burnt’ the place(s) of Osijek
A series of haunting pictures of‘homes’ and ‘family places’: drawings by chil­
dren from Osijek in Croatia where the territory of ‘home’ (i.e. of the ‘well-pla­
ced’) was not ‘dis-placed’ but brutally destroyed and shattered; the places where 
‘death and destruction belong to their [children’s] everyday experience’ (Tod und 
Zörsterung gehören zu ihren alltäglichen Erfahrungen).14
‘Our house in Bosnia has been burnt’, says 13 year old Dragana Ereiz. ‘Home’ 
is destroyed by fire: not the fire of spirit and of soul but of hatred and murderous 
zest. This is a story well-recorded in history, a conquest lit up by stakes and burning 
houses, and yet there is something particularly tragic when, as a psychologist from 
Zagreb says, ‘The children have lost their beds, toys and friends - simply everything’. 
To lose everything, to lose simply everything (sinfach alles), is possibly a kind of 
loss unknown to philosophy which talks about nothingness but which does not live 
it because it always finds shelter in the Holy Land, among the Holy Family, of 
concepts and ideas which neutralize a loss. Therefore a loss experienced by philo­
sophy can never be qualified as happening ‘simply’, it is never sinfach', it happens 
in the company of metaphors and thoughts which cover up the ‘simply’, the sinfach, 
by the professional fluency in discourse. The calling, the profession of thought, the 
Fach of philosophy, is to achieve a certain regularization, a certain ‘well-placedness’ 
of the world through divisions and categorizations. The Fach of philosophy is to think 
various rubrics where the phenomena of the world could find their shelter. It is all 
a story of the Fach and of the multiplicity of its German meanings: Fach as ‘pro­
fession’, Fach as a ‘rubric’ and/or a drawer (even a secret one where one hides 
shameful or dangerous letters and documents), Fach as a ‘shelter’ (Dach und Fach) 
where one finds protection against the darkness and cold of night. A philosopher 
is a man of Fach, sin Fachmann therefore for him/her the loss is never ‘simple’, 
it never occurs ganz sinfach, it is always accompanied by the hope of a word or 
concept. Even the postmodern, postfordist world of the ‘dis-placed’ with its discon­
tinuities and opacity preserves a thread of continuity, of identity, even if it is a chan­
ging, protean one. It can do it precisely because when thinking its thoughts it blocks 
the way for the ‘simply’, it does not allow the sinfach to come in.
A child is barred from such a possibility; a child is not a Fachmann, a child is an 
amateur, the one who loves, not the one who categorizes and qualifies, or - rather - 
he/she is an amateur because he/she does both things (loves and thinks) simultaneously. 
There is no fissure, no cleavage, no slippage into two, and therefore, as Hegel has shown 
and Derrida confirmed, there is no need of philosophy. Dragana’s drawing belongs nei­
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ther to the ‘well-placed’, nor to the ‘dis-placed’; it locates itself somewhere in the sphere 
of brutality where the wounded and mutilated bodies haunt the shattered houses and the 
fissure is not a mental one but a corporeal experience of suffering and pain. A world 
of no identity, where no identity is possible. In the ‘well-placed’, things belong to their 
respective realms but, first of all, they never shut themselves in them to the total ex­
clusion of another, and, secondly, they are never disintegrated, never fall apart, but form 
a whole due to the power of what we have called here the ‘gravitational puli’. What is 
more, they never utterly exhaust their usability, neither are they thrown away as useless 
and wasted. Human use (no matter how distorted and how different from the original 
purpose) is always the fate of things in the ‘well-placed’.
The ‘dis-placed’ treats things differently. They are no longer subject to the 
‘gravitational pull’ of the One and have two courses to follow. Either, with the 
inexorable logic of production which never deviates from its purpose, they fulfil 
their functions, or - when used or supplanted by later and more up to date models 
- they are discarded and abandoned. Whereas memory is the element of the ‘well- 
placed’, forgetfulness and oblivion belongs to the ‘dis-placed’.
Dragana’s drawing hovers on the border, a ghastly and dark territory between the 
two. As in the ‘well-placed’ at-homeness, things do belong to their realms, but evi­
dently they are locked for ever in their frames or cages without the slightest possibility 
of communication and interrelatedness. With the ‘dis-placed’ they are linked by their 
state of abandon and the status of throw-aways. But what is traumatic in the drawing 
is the fact that the things are disintegrated parts of a whole which once is represented 
as the human body (mutilated and scarred, torn into parts), another time as the system 
of clothing which remains oddly empty and discarded without the human body in it, 
in yet another version it becomes a broken symbol of ideological discourse and home 
mythology. These fragmented, used up objects do not disappear as they should in the 
‘dis-placed’, neither can they form a homogeneous whole, as they should in the ‘well- 
placed’. Dragana has painted them as immobilized for ever in the patches of light 
emerging from the sea of darkness: they are fragmented objects which refuse to dis­
appear, to fall into oblivion and which will never make another ‘healthy’ whole: 
a ghastly ‘home’ of amputated legs and heads, neither ‘well-placed’ nor ‘dis-placed’, 
beyond even such a broad and comprehensive category as the postmodern.
This is the end-note. One cannot go further without getting lost in the dark­
ness - the end-note which marks the end of much more than this unimportant and 
humble paper. The end of the European Renaissance myth of society as a body 
with the king as its head, the phallocratic rex erectus. The end of the Enlighten­
ment myth of society in the march towards ever greater perfection, the myth at 
the end of which there emerged Adam Smith with his division of labour, wealth 
of nations and pragmatic concepts of the use value of objects. ‘This is the end, 
my beautiful friend. This is the end.’1'’
Tadeusz Slawek
University of Silesia, Katowice
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Fig. 1 Der Stern, 5 January 1994
Dragana Ereiz ist 13. ihr 
Horrorgemälde zeigt abgetrenme 
Körperteile, daneoen zerbro­
chene rriedenszeichen. Sich 
selbst stellt Dragana, recnls 
unten, m Kämpferpose dar. »icn 
will heim», sagt das Flücht­
lingskind. »aber unser Haus in 
Bosnien ist abgebrannt«
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„Nasz dom spłonął”: poza dialektyką miejsca i przestrzeni
Streszczenie
Opierając się na pracach Derridy, de Certeau, Deleuze’a i Guattariego, a także nawiązując do 
tragedii ziem pojugosławiańskich, autor próbuje zaproponować typologię relacji człowieka i prze­
strzeni. Systematyzuje ją w dwa typy związku. W jednym rzeczy pozostają w pewnym niezakłóco­
nym porządku, są dobrze zakotwiczone i umiejscowione {well-placed) w świecie; w drugim typie 
relacji przedmioty zostają uwolnione ze swych miejsc i niejako wprawione w ruch (dis-placed). 
Moment przejścia między jednym porządkiem a drugim nazywamy „kryzysem znajomego obrazu 
świata” {crisis in familiarity). Na przykładzie romantycznej literatury zostaje przedstawiony trady­
cyjnie rozumiany model świata jako „domu”, tj. przestrzeni, w której przedmioty codzienne zacho­
wują w sobie rewelatorską silę odsłaniania przeszłości i w ten sposób pozwalająjednostce zachować 
poczucie przynależności grupowej. Dwie inne cechy „domu” to traktowanie teraźniejszości jako 
trudnej do pokonania (mourning) przeszłości oraz sens relacji między żywymi a zmarłymi. Te właśnie 
predyspozycje stanowią szczególną wartość „domu” w niesprzyjających warunkach historycznych 
(np. Polska rozbiorowa). Ta formacja związku ze światem zostaje zastępowana przez relację, w której 
„dom” i „zamieszkiwanie” ustępuje miejsca „wędrówce” (Thoreau i sauntering), „pomieszkiwaniu” 
(Dillard i sojourning) i „nomadyzmowi” (Deleuze i Guattari).
Tadeusz Sławek
„Notre maison a brûlé": en dehors de la dialectique du lieu et de l’espace
Résumé
Se servant des travaux de Derrida, de Certeau, de Deleuze et de Guattari, mais aussi en évoquant 
la tragédie des pays post-yougoslaves, l’auteur propose une typologie de relations de l’homme avec 
l’espace. Il les systématise en deux types de relation. Dans le premier type de relation les choses 
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demeurent dans un ordre non troublé, sont bien ancrées, bien placées (well-placed) dans le monde 
alors que dans le deuxième type de relation les objets se détachent de leurs lieux d’origine et sont, 
pour ainsi dire, mis en mouvement, dé-placés (dis-plucedY Nous appelons „crise de l’image fami­
lière du monde” (crisis in familiarity) le moment de passage d’un ordre à l’autre. A l’exemple de 
la littérature romantique, on présente le modèle du monde traditionnellement imaginé comme „mai­
son” c’est-à-dire un espace dans lequel les objets quotidiens gardent en eux une force révélatrice 
du passé ce qui permet à l’individu de maintenir le sentiment de l’appartenance au groupe. Deux 
autres traits de la „maison”, c’est le fait de traiter le présent comme un dépassement difficile, un 
„deuil” (mourning) du passé et la signification de la relation entre les vivants et les morts. C’est 
ces prédispositions qui constituent une valeur particulière de la „maison” dans les conditions histo­
riques défavorables (p. ex. la Pologne à l’époque des partages). Cette formation de la relation avec 
le monde est remplacée par une relation dans laquelle „maison” et „demeure(r)” cède la place à la 
„migration” (Thoreau et sauntering), à „sèjour(ner)” (Dillard et sojourning) et au „nomadisme” 
(Deleuze et Guattari).
Tadeusz Slawek
